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I. Introduction
Be it in the United States or across the Atlantic, notions of citizenship
conjure up thoughts of nationalism, membership, equality, price and patriotism.
Though these notions suggest a sense of inclusion, the term citizenship also conjures
up, for many, feelings of exclusion and subordination. This article will examine the
fact that despite the virtuous rhetoric associated with the term, the status of citizen is
often an elusive ideal, notwithstanding the attainment of such status. While the
status is theoretically to include a litany of rights as well as a perception of
belonging, for many in this society, citizenship means neither. Although many
consider citizenship as deriving from a few sources and resulting in one form of
membership, this article will demonstrate that in the United States there are differing
forms of the status and each containing various levels of participation and inclusion.'
The various forms include the Fourteenth Amendment Citizens, the Other
Fourteenth Amendment Citizens, and the Alien-Citizens. These various forms of the
status demonstrate that becoming a United States citizen does not result in becoming
an equal member of the body politic.
Professor of Law, St. Thomas University; J.D. University of Wisconsin, 1988; B.A.
Lehman College, 1985. This work is a briefly cited version of a presentationthe author made at the
University of Malaga, Spain, in 1998. The author thanks the organizers of that conference for the
opportunity to express these views. This work is dedicated in loving memory to Carmen Hemandez.
Much thanks goes to Lani Menendez, James J. Malone, and Theron Simmons for their research
assistance. A very special thanks goes to Christina D. RomAn, ak.a. "peanut," for being the author's
companion, closest friend, honest critic, cheapest analyst, and vision of true beauty.
I
See e.g., Richard Delgado, Citizenship: How Society Rejects the Very Person It Most
Needs In the Coming Race War? 142 (1996); Neil Gotanda,Race,Citizenship, and the Searchfor
PoliticalCommunity Among "We The People," 76OR. L. REv. 233 (1997); Kevin R. Johnson,An
Essay on Immigration, Citizenshipand the U.S./Mexico Relations: The Tale of Two Treaties, 5S.W.
J. L. & TRADE AM. 121 (1998); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing-Homo[geneousJ
Americanus: The White Ethnic Immigrant Narrativeand Its ExclusionaryEffect, 72 TUL. L. REv.
1493 (1998); Yxta Maya Murray, The Latino-American Crisis of Citizenship, 31 U.C. DAvis L.

REv. 503 (1998); George W. Gold, The Racial Prerequisitein the NaturalizationLaw, 15B.U. L.
REV. 462 (1935).
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This article will also briefly engage in a comparative critique of the
European Union's notion of citizenship. By exploring the varying United States
models, this article will raise questions concerning the ability of the European Union
to achieve the egalitarian goals of membership and equality. This article, with
perhaps an apocalyptic tone, raises a host of possible scenarios, yet ultimately
suggests that, given the history of the region, the European Union's notion of a fully
unified and integrated Europe is unlikely. Yet another possibility is that if the goal
of full integration is achieved, it may result in a form of citizen that is only
applicable to economic constructs. However, if European citizenship includes
substantive rights then such status will more likely be achieved if the Union remains
white and Christian. Finally, if the skepticism raised in this work proves to be too
grim and the laudable goal of a unified union is achieved, then the notion of
European citizenship may truly become a transformative concept for the region and
perhaps the world.
I1.
The Scope of American Citizenship
For most citizens of the United States, citizenship is supposed to mean
something, and something important. 2 "The concept of citizenship is fundamental to
constitutional interpretation." 3 It is the adhesive that is supposed to establish the
contours of the Constitution and bind the people to the republic. 4 Yet the founding
fathers of this country did little to explain the term. For instance, the original
Constitution of 1798 contained several provisions touching upon the concept, but
failed to define it.5 To this day the concept is replete with ambiguity. This can be
evidenced by what President Clinton recently asked "[c]an we fulfill the promise of
America by embracing all our citizens of all races .... can we define what it means
to be an American, not just in terms of the hyphen showing our ethnic origins but in
terms of our primary allegiance to the values America stands for...
The central discussion of the citizenship concept in the United States
Constitution is addressed in the first and second clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 7 The first provides "All persons born and naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and
the state wherein they reside." 8 The second clause, known as the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, guarantees that no state shall abridge the rights of a citizen of the
United States.9 This section recognizes a form of dual citizenship in state as well as
national. In the leading case attempting to address the term citizen, Justice Miller in

Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 652 (1972) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
Johnny Parker, When Johnny Came Home Again, A Critical Review of Contemporary
Equal Protection Interpretation, 37 How. L.J.393, 396 (1994).
2

3
4
3

Id.
See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

Remarks by President Clinton at University of California at San Diego Commencement,
available at http:llwww.whitehouse.govlinitiativesloneamerica/1997061611894.html (June 14,
1997).
7
See generallythe Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. Article IV.
8
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

6

9

Id.
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the majority opinion in the Slaughter House cases,' 0 indicated that the Fourteenth
Amendment provided a definition of the concept." However, as other scholars have
noted, 12 section one of the Fourteenth Amendment identifies the conditions for
-attaining citizenship rather than define the term. 3
A. The Fourteenth Amendment
(i) Clause One
"All persons born and naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and the state wherein they
reside."' 4 Over time both jurists and scholars have shed considerable light on the
importance of this clause. Indeed, the term citizen has evolved to become something
•.more than just being "born or naturalized in the United States."'" The grant of
citizenship is the formal recognition of these concepts and the guarantee of certain
rights and duties, including the right to suffrage as well as other important
'constitutional rights.' 6 It is recognized as the "right to have rights."
Its
importance, however, does not merely lay with the delineated rights identified by the
courts and legislatures. 8 Citizenship is considered to define the relationship
between the individual and the state.' 9 Citizenship is "the tangible status of dignity,
'legitimacy, participation, accountability, and equality."2 ° It "entails being able to
participate in society, to enjoy its fruits and to fulfill one's own potential ... ,,21 The
status of citizen recognizes that such a person is ordinarily one who possesses
political power. 22 It encompasses a recognized status of the individual in relation to
the state and a relationship of equality among those individuals holding such status.
It thus contains communal as well as individualistic privileges. It is a preferred
status of those in a society.
The Aristotelian construction recognizes that "[h]e who has the power to
take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be
.a citizen of that state." 23 Thus, citizenship is linked to the notions of freedom and
10
1t
12

Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1873).
Id. at 73.
See e.g., Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the FourteenthAmendment, 34SAN DIEGO

L. REV. 681, 691 (1997).
Id. at 693.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Is
See Smith, supra note 12, at 683; Ediberto Romdn,The Alien Citizen Paradoxand Other
Consequencesof U.S. Colonialism,26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. I (1998) [hereinafter, Romdn].
16
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.

13
A.;

1193, 1262-84 (1992).
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J. dissenting).

17

IS
Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History, Evolution, and
-4pplicationsof BirthrightCitizenship in the UnitedStates, 9 GEO. IMMIGR.L.J. 667 (1995).
'19
20

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33 (1975).

21

ANNA COOTE, INTRODUCTION TO THE WELFARE OF CITIZENS:

Christine Chinkin & Kate Paradine, Vision and Reality: Democracy and Citizenship of
Women in the Dayton PeaceAccords, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 103 (2001).

SOCIAL RIGHTS 1, 4 (1992).
22

1941).

23

DEVELOPING NEW

THE BASIC WORK OF ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS, BOOK II (Richard McKeon ed.

Id. at 1178.
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participation in government. 24 Justice Brandeis recognized its importance, declaring
that the loss of citizenship was equivalent to the loss of everything that makes life
worth living. 25
Chief Justice Rehnquist more recently observed "[i]n
constitutionally defining who is a citizen of the United States, Congress obviously
thought it was doing something, and something important. Citizenship meant
something, a status in and relationship with a society which is continuing and more
Chief Justice Warren described
basic than mere presence or residence. 26
citizenship as "that status, which alone, assures one the full enjoyment of the
precious rights conferred by our constitution. 27 Justice Black in Afroyim v. Rusk,26
observed "the citizenry is the country and the country is its citizenry.29 The
Supreme Court had earlier declared that citizenship "convey[s] the idea of
membership of a nation." 30 In other words, citizenship is a broad concept that
signifies not only the rights afforded in the Constitution, it is also supposed to
guarantee an "individual's membership in a political community and the resulting
relationship between allegiance and protection that binds the citizen and the state.3'
Itincludes "the sense of permanent inclusion in the American political community
in a non-subordinate condition .. ,32Thus, citizenship signifies an individual's "full
membership" in a political community where the ideal of equal membership is
theoretically to prevail. 33 Scholars have argued that because "equality and belonging
are inseparably linked," to acknowledge citizenship is to confer "belonging" to the
United States.34
Scholars can find considerable support in the founding fathers'
interpretation of this construct prior to the drafting of the Constitution. For instance,
the authors of the Federalist Papers addressed a form of national citizenship, in
which citizens were to be endowed with equal rights. John Jay in Federalist No. 2
observed that "to all general purposes we have uniformly been one people-each
individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges and
protection. 35 Madison in Federalist No. 57 observed:
Who are to be the electors of the Representatives [in Congress].
Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the
ignorant; not the naughty heirs of distinguished names, more than
the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The
electors are to be the great body of the people of the United
24
25
26

27

Parker, supra note 3, at 396.
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 652 (1973) (Rehnquist J. dissenting).
See supra note 17.

Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
Id. at 257.
30
Minor v.Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 166 (1874).
31
See Note, Membership Has Its Privileges and Immunities: Congressional Power To
Define and Enforce the Rights of National Citizenship, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1925, 1932, n. 42 (1989).
32
JOSE A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 5,n. 12 (1979).
33
See Romn, supra note 15, at 8; see also Kenneth Kurst, Citizenship, Race and
28
29

Marginality,30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1988).
34
Drimmer, supranote 18, at 667.
35
THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 10 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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States. No qualifications or wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or
of civil profession is permitted to 3 6fetter the judgment or
disappoint the inclination of the people.
The concept of citizenship is thus invariably associated with notions of
equality. Professor Ackerman observed "[i]n claiming citizenship, an individual - is
first and foremost - asserting the existence of a social relationship between himself
and others. More specifically, a citizen is (by definition) someone who can properly
claim the right to be treated as a fellow member of the political community. 37
Professor Fox, who recently examined the history of the term, observed that while
"Madison and the other authors of The Federalist Papers may have had little to say
about the substance of citizenship, they did believe that such a thing existed, that it
defined a sphere of equality..." ' James Kettner similarly noted "revolution created
the status of American Citizen and produced an expression of the general principles
that ought to govern membership in a free society... and it ought to confer equal
rights.' ' 9

As these authorities suggest, citizenship refers not only to delineated rights
but a broad concept of full membership or incorporation into the body politic. 40 A
correlative of this concept is a sense of belonging and participation in the
community that is the nation.41 This last component, which contains both legal and
conceptual aspects, demonstrates a psychological component of the term. This
construction of the term suggests the anointment of citizenship as recognizing an
important title that goes to the heart of the individual's feeling of inclusion as well as
the collective citizenry's sense of the virtue of this democracy.42 This facet of the
term in turn strongly suggests a subjective psychological or an "imagined 4 3 quality
to the term. These subjective imagined qualities perhaps help explain why, despite
the widely held belief that citizenship confers full membership and equality, history
belies these beliefs. Indeed, American history is replete with instances where those
who should have been or actually were conferred with citizen status did not enjoy
the benefits of citizenship. This suggests that citizenshrip is subjective and is to be
applied depending upon whether the collective psyche believes an individual or
group deserves the status. As Michael Walzer observed "we who are already
members do the choosing, in accordance with our own understanding of what
membership means in our community and of what sore of a community we want to
have."" Accordingly, when the citizenry, through their officials, decides on
36

THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

37

BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE

1980).
38

74 (Yale University,

James W. Fox, Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, and Federalism: 1787-1882, 60U.PITT. L.REv.

421 (1999).
39

-to
41
42

43

JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 1608-1807 (1978).

See Romdn, supra note 15, at 3.

Id.
See CABRANS, supra note 32, at 5, n.12.
See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES I (1992).
MICHAEL ,VALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 32

(1983).
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membership, ' whether they like us or not "we are supposed to consider them as well
as ourselves. As
B.
The Privileges and Immunities Clauses
The other major citizenship provisions in the United States Constitution are
Privilege and Immunities Clauses contained in Article IV 46 and the Fourteenth
Amendment. 47 The two privileges and immunities clauses contained in the U.S.
Constitution were created during different historical periods and were enacted for
different reasons, but both have common themes which run deeper than their textual
similarities. 48 Today the terms seem mysterious and devoid of meaning. 49 However,
an examination of history reveals that "privileges and immunities" was a more
general term used for what was termed, in Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation as "all the privileges of trade and commerce.50 Article IV of the
Constitution embodied part of the language, and "Chief Justice White later stated
that they were intended to perpetuate the limitations of the earlier Articles of
Confederation."'"
The privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV was called "the basis
of the Union" by Alexander Hamilton in The FederalistNo. 80.52 Article IV of the
Constitution provides "[t]he citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." 53 The framers of the
Constitution envisioned that the clause would embody the failed Articles of
Confederation which had stated: "The better to secure and perpetuate mutual
friendship and intercourse among the people of the different states in this union..
,54 Thus, though the several states were seen as separate entities, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV served to protect the equality of these separate
entities by ensuring that citizens from one state would enjoy the same privileges and
immunities of a citizen from another state.55 Prof. Tribe has observed:
In Corfield v. Coryell, the first major case decided under Article
IV, § 2, Justice Bushrod Washington concluded that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause encompassed those privileges
"which are in their very nature, fundamental; which belong, or
right, to the citizens of all free governments." Among these
fundamental rights he included "the right of a citizen of one state

45
46
47
48

Id.
U.S. CONST. Art. IV.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 1.

LEONARD W. LEVY & KENNETH L. KARST, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION 2019 (2d ed. 2000).
49
Raoul Berger, Reflections On ConstitutionalInterpretation, 1997B.Y.U. L. REV. 517,

534 (1997).
50

Id.

51

Id.

52

See supra note 48, at 2019

53

Id.; See also U.S. CONST. Art. IV. § 2.

Id. (quoting from the language of the Articles of Confederation).
Douglas G. Smith, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2:
Precursorof Section 1 of the FourteenthAmendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 809, 836 (1997).
34
55
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to pass through or reside in any other state, for purposes of trade.
. . or otherwise.. .,,56

In fact, this right to travel for purposes of trade was not unique to the
Articles of Confederation. In Thurlow v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,5 the
Court examined the relationship between trading states and Article IV's Privileges
and Immunities Clause.58 The case involved a tax imposed on goods entering a
state, which was not applied to those items already in the state.5 9 The Court,
examining the past relationship of the states noted that states had in the past
possessed the right to regulate and tax trade with other states, leading to "deep and
malignant animosities" between the states. 60 Because of the restriction on trade
between the states, "the interests and advancement of all was greatly enhanced." 6'
The Court observed that "there was an imperative necessity to wrest this dangerous
power from the individual states, 'and
62 vest it in the general government in order to
secure a uniformity of its exercise.
The Fourteenth Amendment contains similar language to Article IV's
Privilege and Immunities Clause. This passage reads "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States.

. ."6

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, as most know, was undermined and essentially gutted by the
Slaughter-House Cases. 64
Nonetheless, there "are at least two possible interpretations of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2.,,6s The first view asserts
that the clause guarantees citizens from a foreign state the same privileges and
immunities that the residents of that state enjoy. Thus, though a person from a
foreign state may enjoy the same privileges and immunities as the residents of that
state, those privileges and immunities might vary greatly from state to state.
The second interpretation of the clause is that it guarantees a uniform set of
substantive privileges and immunities to citizens of the United States no matter what
rights a particular state constitution might contain." 66 Thus, the clause may "afford

6
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1251, (3"' ed. 2000) (emphasis
added). See also Corfield v. Coryell, F. Cas. 546 (Cir. Ct. E.D. Pa. 1823).
37
Thurlow v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504 (1847).
58
See id.; see also Smith, supra note 55, at 854.
59
See Smith, supranote 55, at 855.
60
See supranote 57, at 568.
61
Id.

62

Id.

TRIBE, supra note 56, at 1030 (citingU.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1)(author noting that
the art. IV Privileges and Immunities Clause and the 14th Amendment language is "misleadingly
similar") (emphasis added).
63

See supra note 49, at 534; see also supra note 55, at 1303 (author asserting that the
Supreme Court interpreted the Privileges and Immunities clause of the 14'h Amendment so narrowly
as to effectively eliminate it from the Constitution).
65
See supranote 55, at 890.
Id. at 890.
64
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substantive protection for certain fundamental rights, as well as antidiscrimination
protection in the regulation of those fundamental rights."' 67
Recent United States Supreme Court cases suggest that Article Four's
Privilege and Immunities Clause, while perhaps encompassing fundamental rights, is
triggered to prevent economic discrimination. For instance, in United Building &
Construction Trades Council v. Camden,68 Justice Rhenquist, writing for the Court,
struck down a New Jersey statute requiring at least 40 percent of the employees of
9
Justice
contractors and subcontractors on city projects be Camden residents.
Rhenquist specifically noted that "The Privileges and Immunities Clause [imposes
70
Similarly, the
restrictions] on state action in the interests of interstate harmony.
7
Court in New Hampshire v. Piper, held that a rule restricting bar admission to
72
Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
residents of the state violated the clause.
highlighted the Court's view of the proper intent of the Clause when he noted that it
"was intended to create a national economic union. 7 3 In Baldwin v. Fish and Game
Commission of Montana,74 Justice Blackman in upholding a state's hunting licensing
system, specifically noted the Privileges and Immunities Clause "has been
interpreted to prevent a state from imposing unreasonable burdens on citizens of
other states in their pursuit of common calling with the state [and] . . .On the
ownership and disposition of privately held property within the state..."

The Models of United States Citizenship Under Clause One of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Despite the notions of political membership, equality, and the Fourteenth
Amendment's declaration bestowing citizenship on those born or naturalized in this
country, this paper argues that there are several types of United States citizens.
These varying forms of citizens are often merely citizens in name only. While a
host of reasons for these forms will be suggested, the fact remains that despite the
rhetoric of equality and egalitarianism, American citizens live under differing
models of incorporation and participation. For instance, there are the traditional
Fourteenth Amendment Citizens who enjoy the full panoply of rights and privileges
associated with citizenship. Then there are the Other Fourteenth Amendment
Citizens, who because of constructions of race and perhaps other impositions of
subordination enjoy anything but equality and full-membership. Finally, there are
the Alien-Citizens, which hold the title of United States citizens but are not
Fourteenth Amendment citizens. These are the forgotten citizens in many respects,
because even immigration and constitutional scholars who often examine citizenship
Ill.

67

Id. at 891.
United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Camden. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
6
Id.
70
Id. at 208.
71
New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
Justice Powell observed that the practice of law was a privilege, in part. because of the
72
lawyer's role in the national economy. Id.
73
Id.
74
Baldwin v. Fish & Gaming Commission of Montana, 435 U.S. 371 (1978).
0s
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rarely discuss the rights of this subordinate group. The citizens in this group derive
their limited rights as a result of colonial conquests sanctioned by language in
Article IV, Section Three of the United States Constitution, also known as the
Territorial Clause. 75 The rights of this group do not derive from concepts of equality
that are the bedrock of the Fourteenth Amendment, but notions of colonial conquest
granted a
empowered by the plenary power of Congress. 76 Congress in turn has
77
lesser form of citizenship that has failed to include the right to suffrage.
The models of American citizenship will be examined in this essay in an
effort not only to expose the anomalous status in which many United States citizens
exist, but also to engage in a comparative discourse. This paper will demonstrate
that despite the inclusive rhetoric associated with the status of citizen, this country,
after more than two centuries, is still struggling with the substantive rights and
perception of belonging of its citizens. In light of these existing troubles, this essay
will question the ability of the European Union to entertain and establish egalitarian
substantive components to European citizenship. Given the history of the region as
well as the racial, religious, and cultural differences of the Union's current as well as
potential members, serious questions exist with regard to whether European Union
citizenship will be nothing more than a means to facilitate commerce of the western
continental powers.
The differing models of United States citizenship demonstrate that despite
the rhetoric associated with the Fourteenth Amendment, full United States
citizenship is a right for most Americans, but is merely an aspiration for millions of
others labeled as citizens. For many that were forced into this country, conquered
by this country, or arrived here seeking to be included, but have not been accepted
because or racial and jingoistic constructions, citizenship represents something other
than full membership. Instead, it reminds the outsider of his or her subordination
and marginalization.
The True Fourteenth Amendment Citizens
A.
The United States recognizes two basic forms of obtaining citizenship:
derived by birth or by naturalization. 78 The citizenship derived by birth arises from
fits soli, being bom within the United States or byjus sanguinis, being bom to a U.S.
citizen.79 The second form, naturalization, originates from art. I of the Constitution
that empowered Congress to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization. 8
For most birthright or jus soli and jus sanguinis citizens, the citizenship
they enjoy comports with rhetoric about the status. These citizens enjoy the formal
delineated rights and privileges of citizenship. This group also enjoys the broader
2.
U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl.
See e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Delima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
Goetze v. U.S., 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Crossman v. U.S., 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. U.S., 182
U.S. 222 (1901); Huus v. New York & Porto[sic] Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); The Diamond
Rings v. U.S. 176 (1901); Dorr v. U.S., 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Balzac v. Porto[sic] Rico, 258 U.S.
298 (1922).
73
76

77

79
79

80

See RomAn, supranote 15, at 3.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See id.

U.S. CONST.art I,§ 8, CI. 4.

U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMP. L. REV.

Vol. 9

attributes of the right. They enjoy and are perceived to enjoy the full membership in
the body politic. They are members of that community who count, who are seen as
well as heard. These citizens are, typically perceived to be white americans.
Equality and full participation fully applies to them, but for many racial and ethnic
minorities, irrespective of jus soli or jus sanguinis status, practice and rhetoric
collide. The legal and moral principles that formed the basis for the Fourteenth
Amendment's citizenship language were subordinated in an effort to exclude or
marginalize the "other" citizens.
The Other Fourteenth Amendment Citizens
B.
Unlike the True Fourteenth Amendment Citizens, the Other Fourteenth
Amendment Citizens enjoy the label of citizen, but have rarely enjoyed the
actualization of the rights and privileges that are associated with citizenship.
Irrespective of how they became associated with this country - the conquered
inhabitants, the victims of the calamity of slavery or the groups of nonwhites, who
believed in the fallacy of Emma Lazarus's poem written at the feet of the Statue of
Liberty 8 ' -- they are not full citizens. These other citizens demonstrate that in this
country there are classes of citizens, and these differing groups do not enjoy the
same rights.
Notions of subordinate citizenship have a history going as far as the
Greek citizenship developed into levels of
genesis of the very concept.
membership.82 As Aristotle observed "there still remains one more question about
the citizens: Is he only a true citizen who has a share of office, or is the one to be
included?'483 The conclusion Aristotle reached was that "[s]ince there are many
forms of government there must be many varieties of citizens.., so that under some
government the mechanic and laborers will be citizens. 84
The Romans similarly used different classes of citizens.8" For the Romans,
some citizens could vote but others were forbidden. 6 Some would be exempt from
8
obligations such as taxation, other were obligated to pay taxes.
The United States philosophy towards citizenship was influenced
substantially by theorists who approved of full, as well as, limited citizens. For
instance, John Locke in two works on civil government developed a theory of
citizenship that was extremely influential in both eighteenth and nineteenth century
America. Locke Observed:
because commonwealth not permitting any part of their
dominions to be dismembered, nor to be enjoyed by any but those
of their community, the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the
possessions of his father but under the same terms his father did,
EMMA LAZARUS, The New Colossus, reprinted in EMMA LAzuRus: SELECTIONS FROM
81
HER POETRY AND PROSE 48 (Morris U. Schappes ed.. 3d ed. 1967)
82
83

94
85
86
87

89

See Fox, supra note 38, at 421.
ARISTOTLE, supra note 22, at 1182.
Id. at 1183.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Smith, supra note 12, at 704.
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by becoming a member of the society, whereby he puts himself
presently under the government, he finds there established, as
much as any other subject of that commonwealth [sic].i 9
According to Locke's social compact theory, consent was the central
component to membershipY ° He nonetheless concluded that slaves are "not capable
of any property," but are "subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of
their master [and] cannot be considered in that state as any part of civil society...91
Though his views on the essence of liberty are widely accepted, 92 in a chapter
entitled "Of Slavery" he argued that slavery is "nothing
else but a state of war
93
continued between a laiwful conqueror and a captive."
The influential philosopher Samuel Pufendorf, not unlike Locke, used
natural law theories to justify disparate treatment of the citizenry, particularly
women. 94 He argued "whatever inequality between citizens arises after the
formation of states, owes its origin either to the public administration, whereby the
supreme authority delegates to certain citizens the exercise of some special authority
95
over the rest, or to some special privilege granted by the supreme authority."
These political philosophers, who championed a social compact theory of
government based on natural law, significantly influenced American citizenship
jurisprudence.9 They recognized that an individual's consent to citizenship meant
the individual succumbed certain rights to the government and nevertheless
maintained certain basic rights.97 This equality of the privileges and immunities
concomitant with citizenship was, however, not available to certain groups, such as
slaves, because these individuals were unable to enter into the compact.
Interestingly, the philosophers who had such impact on domestic citizenship theories
failed to examine the normative value of selective application of the rights of
citizenship. These natural law theorists failed to examine the morality of slavery;
they merely descriptively noted that slaves were incapable of citizenship. 9
Indeed, this sort of intellectual sophistry was the theoretical basis for the
DredScott court's denial of citizenship to an African-American in 1856.9 9 Scott, the
slave of John Sanford, brought suit in federal court for his emancipation.100 Though
enslaved in Missouri, a previous owner had taken Scott from Missouri to Illinois, a

89

JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT

66 (Prometheus Books ed.

1986).

90
91
92
93
94

95

Id. at 69.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 33-34.

Id. (emphasis supplied).
See Smith, supranote 12, at 711-16 (discussing Pufendor's theory of citizenship).

SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO (1688), reprinted in 2
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 392 (C.H. & W.A. Old Father, trans., James Brown Scott ed.,

1934).
96

97

9
91)

0

See Smith, supra note 12, at 711.
Id.
See LOCKE, supra note 89, at 54; Pufendorf, supra note 95, at 345.
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 481-82 (1856).
Id.
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state that did not recognize slavery.' ' Justice Taney, writing for the Court, denied
any claim that a "Negro" was part of "the people" under the Constitution. 0 2 He
argued that "Negroes" were not intended to be part of the people because they were
"considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated
by the dominant race . ."103 Justice Daniel proclaimed:
[t]he African .. .was regard and owned in every state in the
Union as property merely, and as such was not and could not be a
party or an actor, much less a peer in my compact or form of
government established by the states or the United States.... [S]o
far as rights and immunities appertaining to citizens have been
defined and secured by the constitution and laws of the United
States, the African race is not and never was recognized [sic]
either by the language or purposes of the former.","
Though the Scott decision was essentially overruled by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution, 10 the Scott Court's sophomoric and descriptive
analysis has support in the text of the Constitution. Article IV, section 2 of the
Constitution guarantees citizenship (comity), but allowed for an exclusion for
fugitive slaves.' 6 This is a constitutional recognition that slaves could be excluded
from the privileges and immunities enjoyed by citizens.
The following section demonstrates how African-Americans, NativeAmericans, Mexican-Americans, and other non-white minorities have been denied
the status of true or full citizenship.
(i)
African-Americans
The subordinate and disenfranchised status of African-Americans is a
perception that is not limited to the eras of Scott v. Sanford"_ and Plessy v.
Ferguson.t 8 Rather, it is a view still maintained by many Americans, particularly
African-Americans. The words of Malcolm X illustrate the depth of frustration,
estrangement, and alienation of these other citizens.
The Blackman should be exempt from all taxation...
we want the federal government to exempt our people from all
taxation as long as we are deprived of equal justice under the laws
of the land.., why should you be taxed if you don't get anything
in return? How can you be charged the same tax as the white
man.. .You have no business in a government, as a second class
citizen, paying first class taxes. The government of the United
States should exempt our people from all taxation as long as
we're deprived of equal protection of the laws.

10l
102
103
04

105
1(y
107

108

Id.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 404-05.
Id. at 981-82 (Daniel J.concurring opinion).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
U.S. CONST.art. IV, § 2.

Scott, 60 U.S. at 481 (1856).
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537 (1896).
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You don't have second class citizenship anywhere on earth, you
only have slaves and people who are free.' 9
The very nature of how African-Americans arrived in this country suggests
that, particularly those born here must be citizens, as they would have difficulty
owing allegiance to any other government other than the one of their place of
Thus, the principles of equality and membership should always have
birth. 1
applied to African-Americans. They, however, did not. As the above quote
suggests, many, including the author of this article, believe that the principles of
membership associated with citizenship still do not fully apply to AfricanAmericans.
The history of court-sanctioned exclusion of African-Americans stems
from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford,"' where
the Court held that African-Americans, even those residing or born in a free
territory, were not United States citizens." 2 After engaging in an extensive
discussion of the meaning of citizenship, Justice Taney, writing for the Court noted:
we think the Negroes are.., not included and were not intended
to be included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and
can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that
instrument provides for and secures citizens of the United
States." 3
Although the Court claimed to apply the social compact theory, and
presumptively its egalitarian underpinnings, it nevertheless refused to recognize
citizenship of this group because of their perceived inferiority.'" Specifically, the
Court characterized African-Americans "as being of an inferior order, and altogether
unfit to associate with the white race."".5 Essentially adopting the differing models
of membership, the Court refused to recognize African-Americans even those born
free, as citizens because "[i]t is not a power to raise to the rank of citizen anyone
by the laws of the country,
born in the United States, who, from birth or parentage,
6
lbelongs to an inferior and subordinate class.""1
African-Americans were subsequently reminded of their subordinate
status, notwithstanding the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Plessy v.
Ferguson, 1 7 Justice Brown, writing for the majority, upheld a statute that required
the segregation of white and "colored" persons."s Justice Brown based the
opinion's rationale on a constructed distinction between social and legal equality." 9
109

Malcolm X, The Wisdom of Malcolm X (Black Label, Inc., Compact Disk Number

BLCD3-00 i).
Drimmer, supra note 18, at 691-94.
11o
112

Scott, 60 U.S. at 393 (1856).
Id.

113

Id.
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Id. at 407.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 417.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537 (1896).
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Specifically, the Justice observed "[t]he object of the amendment was undoubtedly
to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of
things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions
based upon color, or to
120
enforce social, as distinguished from political equality.'

The social versus legal distinction of Plessy replicated the tortured logic of
Scott even after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. It reiterated that
notwithstanding the amendment's declarations that "all persons born or naturalized"
would be citizens, African-Americans were citizens in name, but not in practice.
The concepts of "equality of rights" and "equality of opportunity" were inapplicable
to them.' 2'
Even after the constitutional amendment that was enacted to
acknowledge their freedom and equality, the Supreme Court reiterated that they
were not true citizens, but second-class citizens or in Malcolm X's words, perhaps
still slaves.
Notwithstanding Brown v. Bd. of Education, 22 African Americans are
repeatedly reminded of their subordinate nature. 12 Whether it be racial profiling,
such as DWB or "Driving While Black," or the more subtle forms of subordination
as identified by Ellis Case in his book "The Rage of a Privileged Class,' ' 124 where he
addresses how African-Americans, irrespective of their achievements, are repeatedly
reminded of the inequality of society.'W The question persists
whether the African26
American is a citizen solely in name or merely "on paper."'
(ii)
The Indigenous Peoples
For the original members of this community, the egalitarian notions of
citizenship were again distorted and perverted. Despite being born in America even
before the "Americans" had discovered America, the indigenous people 127 of this
land were treated as the wards of the white man. 128 The American government
120

Id. at 544.

121

Id.;
Drimmer, supra note 18, at 396.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
The author is often reminded of the subordinated status of African-Americans when he

12
123

recalls a discussion with his friend and closest version of a brother, who happens to be AfricanAmerican and oddly enough named Rodney King, want to leave the author's house after a long
debate about racial politics at around 2:00 a.m. The author told him to stay because the bus station,
the New York/New Jersey Port Authority, wasn't very safe. Mr. King simply reminded the author,
"Ed. remember I'm black, everyone sees me as a criminal, so they are scared - I've got more
problems with cops." This sadden the author and still does because the author's friend, who
happens to be an honest and honorable man could never take of f the chains of stigma and

subordination. It reminds the author that despite his cultural pride and willingness to attack racial
injustice, the author can hid or assimilate, yet his friend can rarely, if ever, do that.
124
ELLIS CASE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993).
125
Id. at 4-10. ("You feel the rage of people, [of] your group ... just being the dogs of
society.")

126
Here, the author undertakes the unconventional approach of quoting his research
assistant, Mr. James Malone, who better study hard for his finals.
127
Following Professor Robert Porter's important work on citizenship forced upon
indigenous peoples. I will use the term indigenous peoples. Robert B. Porter,The Demise of the
Ongiweghoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing
American Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACK LETrER L.J.107 (1999).
128
Drimmer, supra note 18, at 689.
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refused to grant birthright citizenship to this group, who were viewed as different
from the true citizens. Even after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
courts continued to struggle with whether indigenous peoples were citizens by
birthright. In an effort to protect the perception of what was an American, courts
became resolute in not diluting citizenship with that which was perceived to be an
inferior class of people. The government used the pretext that indigenous peoples
should be treated as something other than citizens because they were a "free and
independent people" who had never engaged in the social compact to swear
allegiance to this country.' 29 Shortly after the United States government considered
this group to be something other than citizens, the government entered into treaties
with tribes in order to maintain a relationship that would purportedly afford each
side a sense of sovereignty. 30 Despite the pretext of sovereignty, the true basis for
the subordination of indigenous peoples was based on the belief that they were "an
inferior race of people.""' Indeed, the subordination of indigenous peoples in
decisions such as Johnson v. McIntosh,132 facilitated the alternative models of
subordinate citizens. This in turn facilitated the Dred Scott decision as well as the
subordination of others, such as people of color seeking to be naturalized and the
inhabitants of this country's overseas colonial conquests.
Not long after the euphemism of sovereignty was established and treaties
were entered into, the United States government ceased to use treaties and simply
told the indigenous peoples what they could and could not do, and where they could
do it. 33 In large part because indigenous peoples were viewed as part of their own
sovereign tribes and were subject to the laws of the tribe, the United States took the
position that the indigenous people could be dismissed as a separate people living in
certain34 sections of America that could be controlled without any recourse on their
part.1
Eventually, the complete disregard for indigenous peoples gave way to
comprise to another form of subordinate citizenship. The process of granting United
States citizenship to indigenous peoples came in steps and occurred over a
considerable period of time. The first step was the grant of citizenship as an
incentive" to remove these people to the West. 35 Thus, some of the early treaties
129
Jackson v. Goodell, 20 Johns. Rep. 693, 712 ("Though born within our territorial limits,
the Indians are considered as born under the jurisdiction of their tribes. They are not our subjects,

bom within the purview of the law, because they are not born in obedience to us.")

130
Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians, With Whom Does the United States Maintain a
Relationship? 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1461, 1462 (1991).
131

See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 569-70 (1823).

132

Id.

133

13
135

O'Brien, supra note 130, at 1480 (In fact: Thomas Jefferson stated:

[W]e shall with great pleasure see your people become disposed to cultivate
the earth, to raise herds or useful animals and to spin and weave, for their food
and clothing... We will with pleasure furnish you with implements for the
most necessary arts. and with persons who may instruct how to make and use
them. Id.
Id.
Porter, supra note 127, at I 1l.

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

Vol. 9

between the Indian Nations and the United States provided for the attainment of
citizenship."' Congress then began to grant citizenship to certain tribes through
legislation.'
Other efforts were made via treaty with Mexico in the treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, in which the Pueblo Indians were deemed United States citizens
by their failure to "choose" Mexican citizenship. Yet another step was through the
Allotment Act, where indigenous peoples were granted citizenship upon issuance of
an allotment.' 38 Thus, by 1924, indigenous peoples could become United States
citizens: through treaty, allotment, and a patent in fee simple by adopting the habits
of civilized life. 39 With the passage of the Indian American Citizenship Act of
1924, the United States government imposed a form of citizenship on all indigenous
peoples and allowed them to have concurrent citizenship with their respective
tribes. 4 These people are endowed with a less than equal form of citizenship; they
were, by no means, afforded the full complement of privileges and immunities
available to birthright citizens. They are not allowed to attain presidential office or
any other public office of this type. 4' They are citizens simply because they have
been born on so-called American soil, but they are regarded as being part of their
tribal communities and are afforded rights and immunities subject to their tribal
governments. 42 Only the fundamental rights of the Constitution are applicable to
this group of "citizens.' 43
This subordinate nature of their membership was again, premised on
notions of inferiority. The group was characterized as existing in a state of
"ignorance and mental debasement."'' 44 The Supreme Court, in United States v.
Ritchie, 45 declared "[fjrom their degraded condition . . . and ignorance generally,
the privileges extended to them in the administration of the government must have
been limited; and they still, doubtless, required its fostering care and protection.' 46
Though labeled as citizens, they too have limited rights. Their subordinate,
alienated, and conquered status perhaps remains by virtue of the very citizenship
status that the United States government forced upon them.
(iii)
Mexican-Americans

Id. (citing Treaty with the Cherokee, July 8, 1817, art. 8, 7 Stat. 1256; Treat with the
Cherokee, Feb. 27, 1819, art. 2, 7 Stat. 195, 196; Treaty with the Choctaw, Sept. 27, 1830, art. 14, 7
Stat. 333, 335; Treaty with the Ottowa, June 24, 1862, art. 4, 12 Stat. 1237, 1238; Treaty with the
Seneca, Mixed Seneca, Shawnee, Quapaw, Etc., Feb. 23, 1867, art. 13, 17, 28, 15 Stat. L. 513.
13
Id. at 112 (citing Act of March 3. 1843, S. Stat. 647 which naturalized the Stockbridge
Tribe.)
138
Id. at 120.
139
Id. at 123.
40
Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(2);see also generally Rebecca Tsosie,
Sacred Obligations: InterculturalJustice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47UCLA L. REV.
1615 (2000).
141
O'Brien, supra note 130, at 1481.
136
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Goodell, 20 Johns, at 720.
United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. 525 (1854).
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"Fifty-years before the pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock, there were
Hispanic urban centers in New Mexico and in Florida. Yet, Hispanics, according to
most Americans, are our most recent arrivals.' 47
Though man1 Americans know that the United States conquered land from
indigenous peoples, 4 consisting of approximately "two million square miles of
territory by conquest and by purchase," 49 what is not well know is the fact that the
United states "conquered Mexico in 1848 and took over half its then-existing
territory.' '150 "The states of California, Nevada, and Utah, as well as portions of
Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and Wyoming
15 were carved out of that 529,000
square mile cession by the Republic of Mexico." '
The taking of the Mexican land was a result of the nation's westward
expansion as journalist John O'Sullivan noted in 1845:
Away, away with all these cobweb tissues of rights of discovery,
exploration, settlement, contiguity, etc. The American claim is by
the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the
whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the
development of the great experiment of liberty and federative
self-government entrusted to us. It is a right such as that of the
for the full expansion of
tree to the space of air and earth suitable
52
its principle and destiny of growth.
"Prompted by this spirit of 'manifest destiny,' the United States declared
war against Mexico to acquire additional territory."' 53 The result was the signing of
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which states in part:
The United States of America, and the United Mexican States,
animated by a sincere desire to put an end to the calamities of the
war which unhappily exists between the two Republics, and to
establish upon a solid basis relations of peace and friendship,
which shall confer reciprocal benefits upon the citizens of both,
and assure, harmony and mutual confidence, wherein the two
peoples should live, as good neighbors...
Among other things, the Treaty provided that the United States would
respect private property rights of Mexican citizens in the newly created portions of
147
Harry Pachon, Crossingthe Border of Discrimination:Has the Civil Rights Movement
Ignored GenerationsoffHispanics? 15 HUM. RTs. 32, 33 (1988).
149
See Tsosie, supra note 140, at 1615 (noting the United States' use of treaties in the

annexation of Mexican and indigenous territories).
149
Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest: Property Rights, Indian Treaties, and the
Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo, 26 N.M. L. Rev. 201,201 (1996).
150
Id.
131
Id.
132

Id. at 208 (citing to RICHARD WHITE, IT'S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN:

A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 73 (1991) (emphasis added).
153
Id.
15
Guadalupe T. Luna, En El Nombre De Dios Todo-Poderoso: The Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgoand the Narrativos Legale4 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 45 (1998) (citing to Treaty of Peace,
Friendship, Limits and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat.

922).
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equally ample
the United States and those individuals would be granted "guarantees
55
as if the same belonged to the citizens of the United States."'
However, as had occurred with the indigenous peoples, 156 many of the
treaty provisions were never honored.' 5 7 As Professor Luna recently observed,
despite the treaty's pledge to "secure Mexicans" their rights to property, by the turn
of the century almost all Mexican-owned land was lost during the land grant
adjudication process [and] . . .challenges from squatters, settler, land speculators
also promoted land alienation." "Most fundamentally, many Mexican citizens,
transformed by the Treaty into United States citizens of Mexican descent, and their
rights in this society, despite the
descendants, never enjoyed full membership
58
Treaty's promise that they would."'
The Mexicans' "rights were denied, language and culture suppressed,
opportunities for employment, education, and political representation were thwarted.
The Constitution and the courts have done little to interfere with the racist
immigration quotas, the Bracero system, and dragnet searches, seizures, and
deportations of anyone who looks Mexican."' 59 "In theory, the Treaty, which ended
the Mexican-American War of 1846 to 1848, promised 'grace and justice' by
codifying the principal diplomatic objective of each party. For the United States,
'grace' meant purchasing, for the bargain-basement price of $15 million, territories.
. For Mexico, 'justice' meant protecting the civil and property rights of Mexican
citizens, including Indians, who without moving had suddenly become new residents
[and citizens] of a foreign nation. ' ' 6° As one writer observed:
In the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and in numerous Indian
treaties, the United States promised to respect property rights of
the conquered. To make such promises during the nation's
idealistic youth or during its feverish expansion across a
seemingly6 unlimited continent is one thing; to keep them is quite
another.'
Despite the grant of United States citizenship pursuant to the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, over one hundred years later Mexican-Americans were
still not accepted as full members of the body politic. For instance, in 1954, the
United States government initiated "Operation Wetback," the campaign to deport

1$5

Klien, supra note 149, at 201.
Richard Delgado, Review Essay: Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will
We Ever Be Saved? And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for RacialJustice. By Derrick Bell.
97 YALE L.J. 923, 940 (1988). In fact, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was "modeled after ones
drawn up between the U.S. and various Indian tribes, and was given similar treatment... property
[was] stolen, rights were denied, language and culture suppressed, opportunities for employment,
education, and political representations were thwarted." Id.
156
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Johnson, supra note 1,at 123.
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Delgado, supra note 156, at 940.
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Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Mexican-Americans in the United States on the
Sesquicentennial ofthe Guadalupe Hidalgo, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 5, 6 (1998).
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Klien, supra note 149, at 253; see also Guadalupe T. Luna, On the Complexities of Race:
The Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgoand DredScott v. Sanford, 53 U. MIAML. REV. 691 (1999).
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undocumented Mexicans.16 During this massive campaign, over a million 63
Mexican immigrants, as well as United States citizens of Mexican ancestry, and
undoubtedly other Latinas and Latinos, were deported.'T6 The Mexican-American
community was directly affected by this campaign because it was aimed at a racial
group, which meant that the burden of proving citizenship fell totally upon people of
Mexican 16descent. Those unable to present such proof were arrested and returned to
Mexico. 5
Other examples of their outsider status include the popular depictions of
illegal immigrants as Mexicans who have illegally crossed the border, despite the
fact that at least, as many illegal immigrants are the result of individuals overstaying
their visas.'6 A classic example of the current anti-Mexican-American fever and the
potential consequences of such labeling is California's attempt to implement
Proposition 187, which would have denied illegal aliens access to governmentfunded social services, including health care and education. 167 The campaign to pass
Proposition 187, played a consequential role 161 in the former California Governor
Pete Wilson's re-election campaign. 169 Television advertisements emphasized
Wilson's support for the proposition as they depicted "shadowy Mexicans" crossing
the border in large numbers. 170 Much of the support for the proposition used loaded
pejorative such as "those little f-kers" and even suggested that California may
become a "third world country" or "annexed."''
Obviously, Proposition 187,
though facially neutral, centered on the issue of race and proponents gained support
by stirring the fear of the foreigner.'72 While some may suggest that appropriate
immigration limits are warranted, if Proposition 187 was implemented, further
stigmatizing of Mexican and other
Latina-Latino immigrants would likely result
173
with profound negative effects.
Similarly, if Proposition 187 were implemented, authorities could presume
that those of Mexican ancestry and even other Latinas and Latinos were illegal; this
162
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presumption could lead to the denial of benefits and related depravations for Latinas
and Latinos unless they could prove citizenship. Such negative consequences have
resulted from provisions of United States Immigration Laws that permit sanctions
against those who employ undocumented persons. 174 In fact, the U.S. Commission
have caused many
on Civil Rights has found "no doubt that the employer sanctions
75
employers to implement discriminatory hiring practices.'
(iv) The Naturalized Other-Citizens
As addressed in previous works, 176 American society has imposed a label
These groups are
of foreignness on several groups of American citizens.
constructed as both non-white and non-black in the traditional binary racial
paradigm in this country. These groups of outsiders, irrespective of citizenship
status, are members of an excluded group of society. They are viewed as different
from true Americans. They include Latina and Latino citizens, Asian-Americans,
Arab-Americans, and other non-whites.17 In addition to being characterized as the
"forgotten Americans" and "invisible" ones among us, they are endowed with the
immutable characteristic of alien or foreigner.
Professor Gotanda in his work concerning "the Miss Saigon Syndrome"
addressed the label of foreignness in what he termed as the "other non-whites
dualism.' 179 Noting that race relations in America are typically analyzed in the
whit-over-black paradigm, Gotanda argued that this construct has the effect of
facilitating the failure to examine the unique racism faced by the non-white, nonblack racial minorities. s In the white-over-black paradigm, if a person is not white,
then that person is socially regarded as something other than American.
The Alien-Citizens
C.
The last type of United States citizen is the Alien-Citizen."' For this group
there has never been any pretense concerning the applicability of the Fourteenth
These individuals did not receive the Fourteenth Amendment
Amendment.
citizenship that other United States citizens have attained. They became associated
with the United States as a result of being inhabitants of lands conquered by the
United States.'1 2 These people resided in territories acquired after the SpanishAmerican War and World War 11.183 As acquired in this manner, the United States
Supreme Court has effectively concluded that the Territorial Clause of Article Four
of the Constitution and not the Fourteenth Amendment determined the rights of this
174
173
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See Johnson, Magic Mirror,supra note 164, at 1117.

178

See NEIL GOTANDA, ASIAN AMERICAN RIGHTS AND THE "MISS SAIGON SYNDROME," IN
1087, 1095-96 (Hyung-

ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY

Chan Kim ed., 1992).
179

180

Id.

Id.
Romn, supra note 114, at 3.
182
See Ediberto Romn, Empire Forgotten: The United States' Colonization of Puerto
Rico, 42 VILL. L. REv. 1119 (1997)(hereinafter " Empire Forgotten").
183
Id.
181
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group.'
As interpreted, this provision endowed Congress complete and absolute
power over these people.' s In turn, the Court
and Congress has kept these groups in
86
a subordinate and disenfranchised status."
By the time the Spanish-American War ended in 1898, the United States
had acquired considerable experience in creating subordinate citizenship with
African-Americans, Indigenous Peoples and Asian-Americans. 8 7 As a result of the
war, as well as the conquest of the Hawaiian nation, the United States began its
endeavor as an overseas colonial power. 8s In the Treaty of Paris, Spain officially
ceded "to the United States the island of Porto [sic] Rico and other islands now
under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies."" 9 Consistent with the U.S.
Constitution's grant to Congress plenary power under the Territorial Clause, Article
9 of the treaty granted Congress the power over "the civil rights and political status"
of the territories and its people. 9 Prior to 1898, the United States' policy was to
acquire territories with the vision of granting eventual statehood."91 The Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 illustrates the United States' multi-stage model for acquisition
and eventual statehood.'9 The Treaty of Paris, however, endorsed the United States'
imperialistic venture as it was one of the first times in American history that "in a
treaty acquiring territory for the United States, there was no promise of American
citizenship."' 9 ' In addition, the treaty contained "no promise, actual or implied, of
statehood."' 94 As a result of the war, the United States acquired Puerto Rico, Guam
and the Philippines. 195 Although the United States purportedly intervened in Spain's
relationship with Cuba to help secure independence for Cuba, 96 as a result of the
war, the United States became a colonial as well as world power.' 97

194

See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1898).

185
196
19

Id.
See Roman, supra note 15, at 3-4.

RACIAL

199
189

See RUBIN FRANCIS WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE
ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1893-1946, 35-36, 194-207 (1972).

OF

See generally, Roman, Empire Forgotten,supranote 182, at 1119.

See Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain Art. 11,T.S. No. 343.

190
Treaty of Paris, supra note 189, art. IX; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2 ("The
Congress shall have the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting

the territory or other property belonging to the United States.")
191
Roman, supra note 15, at 17.
192
Afrin Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular
Cases (1901-1922), 65 REv. JR. U. P.R. 225, 237 (1996).
193

JULIUS W. PRATT, AMERICA'S COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 68 (1950).

Id.; See also Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of
Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, available at http://clubs.monterey.edu/mecha/treaty.html.
195
CABRANES, supra note 32.
196
See H.R.J. Res. 233, 5 5 'h Cong., 2d Sess., 30 Stat. 738 (1898) ("that the people of the
194

h
Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent"); H.R.J. Res. 24, Sec. 4, 55"
Cong., 2d Sess., 30 Stat. 738 (1898) ("the United States disclaims any disposition or intention to

exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over [Cuba]").

197
See generally PHILIP S. FONER, THE SPANISH-CUBAN-AMERICAN WAR AND THE BIRTH
,OF U.S. IMPERIALISM XV-XXXiV, 1-150 (1972);see also PHILIP S. FONER, A HISTORY OF CUBA AND
ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 162-275, 347-59 (1963).
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Following the war, intense congressional debate centered on what should
be done with the inhabitants of the newly acquired territories. 98 While the
inhabitants of Guam were, and in many respects remain forgotten, the focus of the
debate was on what was to be done with the inhabitants of Puerto Rico and the
Philippines.' 9 The thrust of the concern was that these territories were different and
inhabited by culturally, ethnically, and racially distinct peoples. 2 0
Congress debated the status of the Filipino and Puerto Ricans
simultaneously. One report portrayed the Filipinos as "physical weaklings of low
stature, with black skin, closely curling hair, flat noses, thick lips, and large, clumsy
feet." 20 'I Representative Sereno Payne trumpeted census reports taken of the people
of Puerto Rico showing that "whites . . . generally full-blooded white people,
descendants of the Spaniards" outnumbered by nearly two-to-one the combined total
of "Negroes" and "mulattoes." Meanwhile, Congresspersons viewed the Filipinos as
"non-white" and, therefore, uncivilized and un-American 2
Comparing the
Filipinos to the people of Puerto Rico, Representative Thomas Spight noted "how
different the case of the Philippine Islands, 10,000 miles away ... The inhabitants
are of wholly different races of people from ours-Asiatics, and centuries cannot
assimilate them. 20 3 Representative John Dalzell stated that he was unwilling "to see
the wage-earner of the United State, the farmer of the United States, put upon a level
and brought into competition with the cheap half-slave labor, savage labor, of the
Philippine Archipelago." 204 Other representatives shared this sentiment; Dalzell's
comments were greeted by load applause in the House.20 5 Similarly, Representative
George Gilbert warned against "opening wide the door by which these Negroes and
Asiatics can pour like the locust of Egypt into this country." 2 6 Senator William Bate
likewise stated:
Let us not take the Philippines in our embrace to keep them
simply because we are able to do so. I fear it would prove a
serpent in our bosom. Let us beware of those mongrels of the
East, with the breath of pestilence and touch of leprosy. Do not
let them become a part 20of
us with their idolatry, polygamous
7
creeds, and harem habits.
The fear of foreign influx was not limited to congressional debate. Even
scholars have contributed to the xenophobia. In a series of articles published in
periodicals such as the Harvard Law Review, this fear of foreigners prevailed. One
writer noted:

198
199
2W0
201
202

203
2A0

Roman, supra note 15, at 17.
Id.
CABRANES, supra note 32, at 4.
Roman, supra note 15, at 17.
Id.
Id. at 18.

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
33 CONG. REc. 3613, 1616 (1990) (remarks of Sen. Bate).
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Our Constitution was made by a civilized and educated people. It
provides guaranties of personal security which seem ill adapted to
the conditions of society that prevail in many parts of our new
possessions. To give the half-civilized Moros of the Philippines,
or the ignorant and lawless brigands that infest Puerto Rico, or
even the ordinary Filipino of Manila, the benefit of such
immunities . . . would be a serious
20 8 obstacle to the maintenance
there of an efficient government.
These concerns and others eventually led to the United States continuing
its ownershi of Puerto Rico and Guam and granting independence to the
Philippines.2 0 Eventually, the people of Puerto Rico were granted a form of U.S.
citizenship.
Through the 1917 grant of U.S. citizenship to the inhabitants of Puerto
Rico, 2" these people of "the empire forgotten" appeared to approach incorporation
into the body politic, but in actuality were never afforded full or "equal"
constitutional citizenship. 2 2 The people of Puerto Rico are not full citizens because
they do not share the same rights held by other United States citizens: they are
disenfranchised people with limited rights. 2 3 As inhabitants of a territory, their
representation in Congress is limited to one non-voting member of the House of
Representatives.21 4 They cannot vote for President or Vice-President,
and their laws
215
and status come under the plenary authority of Congress.
In addition to their inability to participate in the national political process,
the people of Puerto Rico are not entitled to the full complement of civil rights
available to those with constitutionally granted citizenship. The citizenship rights of
the people of Puerto Rico come not from the constitutional authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment, which is the traditional basis for citizenship for those born
or naturalized in the United States, but from the Territorial Clause of the U.S.
2
Constitution.
clause,theCongress
had the
to implement
the
Treaty of Paris,6 21 7Under
whichthis
provided
United States
withauthority
the power
over the "civil

208

Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and

Government by the United States of Island Territory 12 HARV. L. REV. 393, 415 (1899).
2W)
Romdn, supra note 15, at 17.
210
211
212

Id.
Id.

See RomAn, Empire Forgotten, supra note 180, at 1119 (arguing that the United States

has refused to acknowledge its imperialistic role while treating Puerto Rico as a colony).
213
See H.R. Rep. No. 105-131, pt. 1, at 49 (1997) (statement of Rep. Gutierrez).
214
See General Accounting Office, U.S. Insular Areas: Applicability of Relevant Provisions

of the U.S. Constitution, GAO/HRD-91-18 (June 20, 1991) in 3PUERTO RICO POLITICAL STATUS
REFERENDUM 1989-1991, at 471 (P.R. Fed. Affairs Adm. Ed., 1992).
213
See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (holding that the lower level of Aid to

Families with Dependent Children reimbursement provided to Puerto Rico did not violate the Fifth

Amendment's equal protection guarantee).
216
See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl.2 (stating that Congress has the "[p]ower to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States." Id.
217

See Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754.
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rights" and "political status" of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico.218 Consequently, the
citizenship of the people of Puerto Rico is a legislated and colonial concession, not a
9
Unlike other
constitutionally derived right, and it can be revoked altogether.
United States citizens, who by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be
220
the people of Puerto Rico are merely
stripped of their full citizenship status,
statutory citizens. 22 ' Unlike Fourteenth Amendment citizens, the people of Puerto
Rico are similar to aliens because they are "partial members of the community with
limited 2membership rights," subject to congressional revocation of their citizenship
22

status.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged Congress' plenary power
223
In the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court broadly construed the
over the territories.
and refused to limit Congress' legislative power over the
Clause
Territorial
Through the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court developed the
territories. 2
"territorial incorporation doctrine." 225 Under this doctrine, all of the Constitution's
provisions apply to territories that are incorporated into the United States, or assured
eventual statehood, and only "fundamental" constitutional rights are applied to
protect the residents of unincorporated territories.226 The question then became
were considered fundamental and applicable to the
which constitutional provisions
227
unincorporated territories.
See id. at art. IX, 30 Stat. at 1754.
See Jose Julian Alvarez Gonzalez, The Empire Strikes Out: Congressional Ruminations
on the Citizenship Status of Puerto Ricans, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.309. 318-30 (1990).
See Afroyim v. Rusk. 387 U.S. 253,262-68 (1967) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment
224)

218

219

citizenship may not be altered by the federal government, the states or any other governmental
body).
221
See Jones Act of 1917, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 48 U.S.C.).
222

See id.

223

See e.g., De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 197 (1901)

(holding that a territory acquired

by the United States belongs to the United States and is subject to disposition by Congress); Murphy
v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 44 (1885) (stating that Congress could nullify the Utah Territory's
polygamist law); National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 132-33 (1879) (stating that
Congress could nullify the law of the Territory of Dakota).
224
See e.g., De Lima, 182 U.S. at 197; Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221, 221 (1901):
Crossman v. United States, 182 U.S. 221, 221 (1901) (stating in both Goetze and Crossman that a
board of tariff appraiser had not jurisdiction over googds imported from Puerto Rico or the Hawaiian
Islands due to the fact that these were not foreign countries); Dooley v. United States. 182 U.S. 222.
235-36 (1901) (holding that Puerto Rico became part of the United States upon cession by treaty for
purposes of tariffs); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 243 (1901) (holding that tariffduites
on goods imported from Puerto Rico were proper prior to cession by treaty); Downes v. Bidwell,

182 U.S. 244, 278-79 (1901) (concluding that because territories are not constitutional equivalents
to states, they are subject to greater congressional control); Huus v. New York & Port [sic] Rico S.S.
Co., 182 U.S. 392. 397 (1901) (holding that steamship trade between New York and Puerto Rico
came under U.S. trade laws); The Diamond Rings v. United States, 182 U.S. 176, 181-82 (1901)
(construing broadly the Territorial Clause of the Constitution and refusing to limit Congress'
legislative power over the American territories).
225

See generally id.

226

Id.

227

Id.
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The Puerto Rican people's disenfranchised status has not only caused
inequality of political and civil rights, but has also manifested itself through unequal
economic treatment. 228 As a result of their subordinated status, residents of Puerto
Rico receive less favorable treatment than mainland citizens under a number of
major federal benefit programs. For the residents of Puerto Rico, federal payments
under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and food stamps
are made at lower levels and are subject to an overall cap.229 Similarly, the
Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) does not apply to Puerto Rico.230
Benefits under a similar program are capped and are made at lower levels than SSI
3
payments made to eligible persons residing in the states.
I Benefits for needy
23 2
children are likewise provided at appreciably lower levels.

As inhabitants of an unincorporated territory, the people of Guam do not
possess even the modicum of local autonomy brought by the anomalous
commonwealth status. 3 Instead, they live in a state akin to the naked colonialism of

centuries past. Guam, the other major acquisition of the Spanish American War, was

ceded to the United State along with Puerto Rico in the Treaty of Paris. 234 Since said
acquisition in 1898, the United States has maintained absolute and plenary power
over Guam under the territorial clause of the United States Constitution. 235 Initially,
the territory was under control of the Department of the Navy; then, after over fifty
years of absolute rule, control of Guam was transferred to the Department of the
Interior. 2 6 Yet this modification procured very little for the Guamanians because the
Organic Act of 1950 only established a local government structure and granted

228

For example, Puerto Rican citizens, with the exception of federal employees, are exempt

from federal income taxes on Income eamed in Puerto Rico. See e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 933 (1994).
229

See S. REP. NO. 101-481, at 10-11 (1990) ("Under present law, federal social welfare

programs under the Social Security Act such as AFDC, Medicaid, Aid to the Aged, Blind and
Disabled, Foster Care and Adoption Assistance, and Social Services block grants operate differently
in Puerto Rico than they do in the states. Under statehood, boththe amount of the welfare benefits
and the percentage of population receiving them would increase."); see also T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects, 11 CONST.
COMMENTARY 15, 15 (1994).
230
See Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1978) (holding that govemment benefits of a
state citizen do not transfer when that citizen moves to Puerto Rico).
231
See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 303(b), 86 Stat. 1329,
1484 (repealing Titles 1,X, and XIV of the Social Security Act with the exception that these titles
would still apply to Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands); 42 U.S.C. § 1308(a)(l)(Supp. 1997)
(specifying the amount of social security payments to Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and
American Samoa); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b)(1994).
232
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b)(1994)
233
H.R. 1720-01 (1993) ("as a possession of the United States, the island can be bought,
sold, or traded by the federal govemment").
2M
See Samuel J. Cohen, The Extension of U.S. Tax Treaties to U.S. Territories As
Illustratedby the Example ofGuam, II UCLA PAC. BASIN Bus. L.J. 32 (1992).
Lisabeth A. McKibben, The PoliticalRelationshipBetween the UnitedStates and Pacific
Entities: The Path to Self-Government in the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau and Guam, 31
HARV. INT'L J. 257 (1990).
M
Id.at 287.
233
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United States citizenship. 237 As such it failed to provide autonomy because it
maintained the trappings of foreign control by, among other things, denying
Guamanians the right to elect federal representatives. 238 In 1970, the people of
Guam were afforded a form of quasi-representation similar to that afforded to the
people of Puerto Rico which entails the election of a non-voting representative who
exercises a lobbyist like role in Congress. 239 However, their inability to participate
in presidential elections has remained unaltered. 240 This inequity was further
heightened when the United States Supreme Court dissolved the Guamanian
Supreme Court.24 ' This action was consistent with the Court's previous preacquisition confirmation of Congress' unconditional authority over the
242 territories
which is "an accident of sovereignty and continues until granted away.,
This allowance has so inhibited the Guamanians' relentless quest for
autonomy that their only option has been compromise. Hoping to emulate the
inhabitants of Puerto Rico, the Guamanian legislature established a commission of
self-determination with the belief that commonwealth status will procure greater
autonomy.
Currently, this request for the greater local autonomy afforded by
Commonwealth status is ongoing.
Despite the global emphasis on self-determination following World War H1,
the United State's policy towards Micronesia or the Trust Territory of the Pacific
was blatantly imperialistic. The Trust Territory of the Pacific was, with United
Nations approval, under the complete and total domination of the United States.244
However, once it became the only remaining trusteeship in the world the United
States was forced to create a less obvious colonial form of citizenship as it had
granted to other territories. The United States created the concept of commonwealth
and free association. Like citizenship status, commonwealth status turned on
procedural self-determination. It masked the complete political and economic
dependency upon the United States by focusing on the free choice of the habitants to
remain dependent on U.S. aid and militar protection. The Northern Mariana Islands
were also annexed after World War 11.24 In 1972, the Marianas began negotiations
246
toward its eventual commonwealth status , which under the United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 1471 suggests a form of autonomy, the United States
maintained certain sovereignty so as to protects its strategic interest. The United
237

238
239

240

See 48 U.S.C. § 1423(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1407 (1986).
See McKibben, supranote 233, at 281.
Id.
48 U.S.C. § 1711-1715 (1986).

See generallyTerritory of Guam v.Olsen, 431 U.S. 195 (1977).
National Bank v. County, 101 U.S. 129, 132-33 (1880).
See Guam's Quest for Commonwealth Status: Implications for the U.S. Virgin Islands,
Address by Franklin J. Arceo Quitugua, speaker of the 19"'Guam Legislature, at St. Croix, U.S.
Virgin Islands (Dec. 9, 1988), at 7-8.
244
See e.g., Hirayasu, The Process of Self-Determination and Micronesia'sFuture Political
Status Under InternationalLaw, 9 U. Hawaii L. Rev. 487 (1987); Comment lnternationalLaw and
Dependent Territories: The Case of Micronesia,50 Temp. L.Q. 58 (1976).
245
See Hirayasu, supra note 244, at 487; Comment, supra note 176, at 58.
246
See Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, Pub. L. No. 94241, 90 Stat. 263 (1976).
241
242
243
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States has maintained that the covenant that created the commonwealth comes under
the United States Congress' plenary power under the territorial clause. 247 The people
of the Marianas have opposed its subordinate colonial status, including Northern
Marianas Legislatures' resolution to the United Nations requesting that an agreement
to terminate the trusteeship that would include24 the provision that the United States
control over the internal affairs of the territory. 1
As the preceding paragraphs suggests, these inhabitants of the United
States' colonial conquests are provided with labels such as citizen and nation, yet
they are anything but members of this Union.
IV.
European Union Citizenship
In order to appreciate the nature of European citizenship, it is necessary to
appreciate the context in which it arose. After the destruction of World War 11, there
was a great incentive to promote peace and unity in the region. On September 19,
1946, Winston Churchill promoted this when he envisioned a "sovereign remedy [to]
.. recreate the European family ... We must build a kind of United States of
Europe. ' 249 By 1951, six countries combined to create the goal of integration or a
common market for coal and steel under the European Coal and Steel Community. 210
In 1957, the group entered into the European Atomic Energy Community and the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community. 25' In part due to the belief
that the goal of a common market needed substantive rights because such a market
would affect the lives of individuals in substantive ways,25 2 the member states
254
3
entered into the Single European Act,2 which did not rest solely on economics.

These, along with other treaties, led to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which,
255 along with
promoting the goal of a common market, created European citizenship.
The Maastricht Treaty promoted a common European foreign and security
policy 25 6 as well as established European citizenship. 257 The nationals or citizens of

the member states of the European Union have attained the rights as citizens of the
European Union, which can be upheld by national courts and by the European Court
of Justice. 258 The concept of European citizenship creates a form of dual citizenship
247

McKibben, supra note 235, at 280.

54 U.N. TCOR (1 627 hMtg.) at 2-42, U.N. Doc. T/N 1627, Annex t/I908/Add.l (1987).
Sara L. Uberman, The Brussels 11 Convention: A Tool Necessary to Enforce Individual
Rights Relating to MatrimonialMatters Within the European Union, 23SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 157 (1998) (quotingP.S.R.F. MATHUSEH, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 12 ( 6 h ed.
1995).
Mo
Id. at 159 (citing Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steal Community, April 18,
1951,261 U.N.T.S. 140).
231
See Euratom Treaty, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 257; EEC Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 257.
See Uberman, supra note 249, at 159.
252
253
Single EuropeanAc4 1987 O.J. (L169) 30; 25 l.L.M. 503 (1986).
2
See Uberman, supra note 249, at 159.
255
Id. at 166.
M
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1757 U.N.T.S. 3.
257
Id. Part 11,Art. 8(l), at 143.
25
Closa, A New Social Contract? EU Citizenship as the Institutional Basis ofa New Social
Contract, EU Working Paper, RSC No. 96/48; see also Title lArt. A.
248
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in both the member state as well as in the Union. While many view the Union's
creation of European citizenship as stemming from its supranational status, the
Treaty on European Union establishes that European citizenship is to be
complementary to the citizenship status of the member states. Specifically, Article
17 of the E.C. Treaty provides "every
2 59 person holding the nationality of a member
state shall be a citizen of the Union."
The concept of European citizenship encompasses a host of rights. They
were to include specific delineated rights, addressed below, as well as a sense of
membership by the creation of "an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe." 260 Some writers have argued that European citizenship performs a binding
function by creating a "direct political link between the individual ... and the Union
in order to bring them closer together."2 61 Nonetheless, European citizenship is
largely viewed as based on the principle of free economic movement and some have
is "definitely not the expression of belonging to a political or social
argued that it
' ' 62
community. 2
European citizenship rights, which have always been regarded by the Court
of Justice as general principles that the European institutions were bound by, were
written into treaties at various stages.263 For instance, the Treaty of Rome began by
outlawing discrimination based on nationality in matters connected with the free
movement of workers.2 64 Subsequently, three other instruments - the Single
European Act 265 (1987), the Maastricht (1992) and the Amsterdam (1997) Treaties added further rights, which can be divided into three major categories. The first two,
which are largely based on promoting democracy and commerce, include: 1) rights
inherent in the freedom of movement, and 2) individual procedural democratic
rights. 266 The third category, which is more controversial, perhaps because it is
substantive, is the right to invoke fundamental human rights.
In 1993, the amendments to the European Community Treaty introduce the
political and economic components of European citizenship. These rights include:
The right to vote: European citizens are entitled to vote in their country of
267
origin or residence in the European Parliamentary elections.
This right was
considered particularly important in promoting the free access of workers in the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J.C. 224/1 (1992), 1
C.M.L.R. 573.
2(A)
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 1, O.J.C. 340/2, at 152 (1997). 137 I.L.M.
at 68.
261
See Shaw, The Many Pasts and Futures of Citizenship in the European Union, 22E.L.
REV. 554, 564 (1997).
262
Annette Schrauwen, Sink or Swim Together? Developments in European Citizenship, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 778 (2000).
263
Citizenship
Towards
Post-National
Membership.
available
at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-06-1.
264
Id.
265
United for Intercultural Action, EU Citizenship and Equal Rights for All! available at
http://www.united.non-profit.n I/eurocit.gb.html.
266
Id.
267
Article 8B(2) of the EC Treaty; see also J.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
259
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8 (1998).
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Union to attain employment within member states. Related to these rights is the
ability to run as a candidate in European Parliament elections. 26' The Treaty also
stipulates that a uniform voting procedure is to be introduced. Each member state
therefore organizes the election in accordance with national electoral laws.269
The right of petition: It includes the power to submit a petition to the
European Parliament on any matter regarding the Union, simply by sending a signed
letter.270 Parliament can then investigate any violation of an individual's rights by a
member state or member instittition. There is also the right to apply to the
Ombudsman concerning matters of misadministration in the activities of the Union's
institutions. 27' These also are ways for the public to make proposals aimed at
improving the Union's legislation and executive action.272
The right of free movement and residence: European citizens have the
right to move and reside freely within the territories of all member states.273 This
right was considered particularly important in promoting the free access of workers
in the Union to attain employment within member states. Related to the right of
movement is the concept of openness: this new obligation introduced by the
Amsterdam Treaty gives the public: the right of access to all documents of the
institutions, subject to limits laid down by the European Parliament and Council.
European citizens
274 also have access to documents produced by member states within
their consent.
Diplomatic Protection: When outside the Union, nationals of one member
state may benefit from the protection of any of the other member states, subject to
certain conditions. 275
Other than these fairly limited political and economic rights, European
citizenship is theoretically to include certain substantive fundamental rights. Critics
of the limited character of the European citizenship concept argue that "[t]he only
way the Union will be able to engage its citizens is the creation of a political and
social community that goes beyond economic integration. 276 Accordingly, it
appears that at least in its initial conception, the notion of European citizenship
resembled not the substantive components of the United States Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment, but the Constitution's Article IV's Privileges and
Immunities Clause. European citizenship has centered on the notion of free trade
and movement of workers, not unlike the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause New Hampshire v. Piper,
Andreu Olesti-Rayo, Some Remarks on the Participationof Citizens in the Process of
EuropeanIntegration,8 MSU-DCL NT'L L. 651, 651 (1999).
See Shaw, supranote 259, at 793.
269
Article 138E of the EC Treaty.
270
Olesti-Rayo, supra note 266, at 651.
271
265

272

Id.

Article 8(c), EC Treaty. See also Theodora Kostakopoulou, Nested "Old" and "New"
Citizenships in the European Union, BringingOut the Complexity, 5 COLUM. J.EURL. 389 (1999)
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where the United States Supreme Court noted the Privileges and Immunities Clause
277
was intended to create a national economic union.
Despite this fact, it appears that over time, European citizenship was to
include something more, "something important." In Europe, in a series of treaties,
while not intending to displace national citizenship, the European Union committed
27s
The Treaty of the European
itself to human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Union provides: "The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights ("ECHR") and
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on November 4, 1950 and as they result
from the constitutional traditions common to the member states, as general principles
of community law., 279 The 1992 Amsterdam Treaty established procedures intended
Specifically, the Treaty of Amsterdam notes that the
to secure their protection.
Union is "founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law principles which are common to the
member states." 28 ' The Treaty effectuates its goals by noting that the European
Court of Justice is competent to address matters concerning institutions affecting
human rights and fundamental freedoms, provided that the Court has jurisdiction
282
under the European Community Treaty and the Treaty on the European Union.
Scholars have argued that this human rights regime forms a central part of Europe's
self-image. 8 3 Others have argued that as a result of these events "respect for
fundamental human rights is now accepted as a central element in the construction of
a democratic and united Europe, and as a critical component of the EU's self-image
as a space of civility and modernity, it is also the fault line on which Europe's
284
internal and external borders are being inscribed .
For instance, the Union has the theoretical power to take appropriate action
to combat discrimination. 215 The possible grounds of intervention are discrimination
based on sex, race, or ethnic origin, religion, belief, disability, age or sexual
orientation. In this regard, the Union has implemented policies to achieve equal
opportunities for women and men. The Amsterdam Treaty has formally empowered
the European Court of Justice to ensure the respect of fundamental rights and
freedoms by the European Institutions. 216 The European Council in Cologne, in June
1999, confirmed the importance of fundamental rights, stressing the need for the
287
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establishment of a European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
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Post-National Rights, II INT'L SOC. SC. J. 11, 21 (1999).
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perceived complementary nature of European citizenship, these substantive
fundamental rights components of European citizenship suggest that such status
creates a supra-national status that supplements state citizenship through the use of
and recourse to international bodies to resolve disputes. 88
Despite the enumerated rights listed previously and the Union's
proclaimed interest in fundamental rights, serious questions remain as to whether the
European Union's notion of citizenship will attain a status that will include
substantive rights, similar to ones held by most United States citizens. Indeed, the
notion of European citizenship raises issues concerning "the meanings of belonging
within Europe."2 Put another way, "what does being European add to being British
or French or Welsh or Breton?" 290
Among the questions that arise include ones relating to membership in the
Union. For instance, because European citizenship is limited to being a citizen of a
member state, how much will that fact limit the force of European citizenship?
Similarly, the question remains whether the perceived universal concept of
citizenship is possible in a newly united multi-ethnic, multi-cultural polity that
derives from a variety of countries and histories. 291 The people of this region speak
different languages, construct different identities, and enjoy different cultures and
histories. These facts in turn pose serious obstacles to overcome in an effort to form
a new identity known as a European Union citizen.
As delineated previously, the incentive for as well as essential components
of European citizenship are largely economic. The rights to free movement for
instance, is recognized as a right to facilitate the free movement of workers in order
to promote commerce. 292 While European citizens have turned to European Union
institutions to assert rights based upon the Union's standards, 293 there still remain
serious questions concerning the extent to which European citizenship will enhance
the substantive rights of citizens within a member state, particularly when that state
does not recognize such rights. Currently, the European Union consists of the
historical western power on the continent. In fact the membership in the Union is a
pre-requisite to citizenship. Related to this point is the fact that European citizenship
as a concept draws a distinction between those who are citizens or members of the
political unit and others who are viewed as outsiders. There is the question
concerning the extent of the applicability of the Union's standard to non-member
European states, such as Bosnia. Will such an excluded state "make a commitment
to human rights commensurate to becoming European, or will it remain outside the
European mainstream?2 94 These questions highlight concerns relating to the
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exclusiveness of European citizenship. Recall that this status only applies to
members of the Union. z95
The fact is that currently the union's membership is considered
predominantly white and Christian. Indeed, the largest party of the European
parliament is the Christian Democrats. Despite the strong economic incentive for the
union to succeed, the history of the region is filled with tension, strife and war.
Given the historical troubles of the members of the region in accepting each other,
particularly when we turn back as far as the crusade and more recently recall World
War II and the recent strife in the Balkans, the question arises whether the Union will
ever be open enough to accept peoples of other races and religions. And even if the
Union is prepared to accept such differences, will member states feel that their
sovereignty is compromised? For instance, both the United Kingdom and Germany
have concluded that nationality for Union purposes does not have to coincide with
nationality in all other respects in the member states.2 6 This is particularly
significant when one considers that access to social-welfare benefits by a Union
citizen residing in a member stat that is not his or her place of birth.297
Similarly, what if the member state is not prepared to be as accepting or
inclusive as the Union? In France, in 1993, for instance, nationality reform was
passed which required individuals born in France of foreign parents would have to
file formal request to become French. 298 Additionally, the member state of Germany
has a history of onerous and restrictive naturalization laws for foreigners. 299Foreign
individuals seeking German citizenship have historically had to demonstrate cultural
integration, which included fluency in written and spoken German. 300
Despite these considerable obstacles, the very thought of a supra-national
form of citizenship has the potential to be truly transforming. Its wonder and
idealistic vision is its potential to redefine our vision of membership and community.
In fact, it could conceivably replace notions as "immigrant," "resident alien," or
"temporary guest" with the status of "Union citizen." 30 ' These goals are indeed
lofty. Time will tell if the long and often violent histories of areas such as the
Balkans can be transformed by this new vision.302 While there are undoubtedly facts
that may suggest a new vision of inclusion, it will be interesting to see what will be
done with Turkey's interest in joining the Union, a country that is predominantly
Muslim. This is particularly so in relation to the long-standing friction with current
European Union member, and predominantly Orthodox Christian Greece. The
question remains: who will be the members and outsiders of the future?
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V.

Conclusion
This article demonstrates that the status of citizen is significant. It includes
the ability to invoke rights and be recognized as an equal. In the United States, the
attainment of such status suggests the achievement of a preferred status in society the status of a member, of an equal participant in the body politic. The history of the
United States' inclusion of people of color as citizens raise questions concerning
whether those individual groups are members or equal participants. After 200 years
of the concept, the United States still struggles with the issue.
The European Union has recently established a form of citizenship. This in
turn has provoked a host of questions. Will European citizenship be truly
substantive or will it be merely an aide to commerce? Will such status be available
to non-western peoples, particularly those of different religions, or will admission
the Union dictate status' 0
Will European citizenship be similar to the United
States' structure, where there are differing models of the status or will the New
World order achieve its lofty goals? Time will tell, but this author believes that such
status will have a difficult time attaining substantive components similar to U.S.
citizenship. If the Union does achieve its goals, the question arises as to whether
such substantive rights will be available to all interested groups. The Union perhaps
will only achieve a substantive and inclusive form of citizenship if it is prepared to
transcend the economic incentives behind integration and be prepared to transform
visions of parochialism and nationalism to a vision of true acceptance to all within
the region.

When raising this question, the author cannot help but recall the semestc he taught in
Spain, and the repeated times one of his students, who is of Greek descent, but apparently resembled
a national of an Arab country, was repeatedly stopped by authorities and obligated to present
identification.

